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Significant prior research has shown that facilitation is a critical part of GSS transition. This study examines an under-researched 
aspect of facilitation—its contributions to self-sustained GSS use among group members. Integrating insights from Adaptive 
Structuration Theory, experimental economics, and the Collaboration Engineering literature, we formalize interactions of group 
members in GSS transition as strategic interactions in a minimum-effort coordination game. The contributions of facilitation are 
interpreted as coordination mechanisms to help group members achieve and maintain an agreement on GSS use by reducing 
uncertainties in the coordination game. We implement the conjectured coordination mechanisms in a multi-agent simulator. The 
simulator offers insights into the separate and combined effects of common facilitation practices during the lifecycle of GSS 
transition. These insights can help the Collaboration Engineering community to identify and package the facilitation routines that 
are critical for group members to achieve self-sustained GSS use and understand how facilitation routines should be adapted to 
different stages of GSS transition lifecycle. Moreover, they indicate the value of the multi-agent approach in uncovering new 
insights and representing the issue of GSS transition with a new view. 
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Using Multi-Agent Simulation to Explore the 
Contribution of Facilitation to GSS Transition 
 
“A word processor that is immediately liked by one in five prospective customers and disliked by the 
rest could be a big success. A groupware application to support teams of five nurses that initially 
appeals to only one nurse in five is a big disaster.” (Grudin, 1994, p. 101).  
1. Introduction 
Group support systems (GSS) transition, a central concern of Collaboration Engineering (CE), is the 
process that starts when some members of a team express interest in using a GSS and ends when the 
team of users has become self-sustaining (Briggs et al., 1998). The Adaptive Structuration Theory (AST) 
(DeSanctis and Poole, 1994) suggests that GSS transition occurs through the interplay among 
technologies, social structures, and human interaction. When a GSS is first introduced into a group, the 
group goes through an appropriation process by which members examine the technology structures and 
agree on when and how to use them, and eventually stabilize the appropriation (Dennis et al., 2001). An 
important implication of AST is that to codify and package best practices of GSS facilitation, CE 
researchers need to understand not only facilitation functions in technology and task management, but 
also how facilitation contributes to a self-sustained agreement among group members regarding GSS 
use.   
 
Achieving continuous agreement among group members is a unique challenge to GSS transition 
(Grudin, 1994). To streamline the terminology, we refer to the GSS transition with the agreement 
challenge as “self-sustained GSS use” in the rest of this paper. GSS are suites of collaborative 
software tools that combine communication, computer, and decision technologies to support problem 
formulation and solutions in teamwork (DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987; Briggs et al., 2003). Most GSS 
are only useful when a high percentage of team members use them. For single-user systems, this 
problem does not apply. For expensive organization-wide systems, top management can step in to 
force the technology transition (Rogers, 1983; Cooper and Zmud, 1990; Lucas et al., 1990; Grudin, 
1994), however, if the financial impact is less salient (Briggs et al., 2003), top management may not 
be motivated to intervene in GSS transition. Moreover, GSS users tend to be inter-divisional, inter-
organizational, or industry-level collaboration teams. A top-down solution may not be applicable to 
such teams. Because of this unique challenge in GSS transition, technology transition theories that 
either focus on individual users or organizations cannot be readily applied to the context of GSS 
(Gallivan, 2001). 
 
Several studies have recognized that self-sustained GSS use should be viewed as a critical mass 
problem, because it is consistent with the notion that “some threshold of participants or action has to 
be crossed before a social movement ‘explodes’ into being” (Oliver et al., 1985, p. 523; Fichman, 
1992; DeSanctis and Poole, 1994; Gallivan, 2001).  Theories of critical mass emphasize 
management of interactions between actors (Oliver et al., 1985; Markus, 1987). Based on the notion 
of critical mass, AST indicates that human interactions underlying self-sustained GSS use can be 
characterized as interdependent decision making in that the degree to which members believe that 
other members know and accept the use of GSS positively affects their expected value of GSS 
(Markus, 1987; DeSanctis and Poole, 1994). Taken together, the critical mass view and AST imply 
that the challenge of GSS transition is essentially a problem of managing interdependencies between 
decision-making of GSS users. In other words, self-sustained GSS use boils down to a coordination 
problem, as coordination is defined as “managing dependencies between activities” (Malone and 
Crowston, 1994, p. 90).   
 
A central premise of the coordination theory is that in order to overcome the coordination problem, 
additional activities must be performed (Crowston, 1997). These activities, called coordination 
mechanisms, serve primarily to manage interdependencies between actors and thereby help actors 
cross the threshold required for a social movement to explode into being (e.g., self-sustained GSS 
use). Prior research from the laboratory and the field implies that GSS facilitation practices are in 
effect coordination mechanisms that help to manage the interdependent decision making of GSS 
users. For example, a number of studies have shown that restricting process structure, a common 
facilitation practice, is effective in producing agreement on GSS use (e.g., Wheeler and Valacich, 
1996; Dennis et al., 2001). This finding implies that one of the coordination mechanisms embodied by 
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facilitation is limiting the number of alternatives available to a group. While the literature has 
accumulated implicit evidence on how facilitation contributes as a coordination mechanism in GSS 
transition, few have explicitly explored the theoretical explanation and empirical implications of such 
mechanism. This knowledge gap can prevent CE researchers from identifying and packaging 
important facilitation routines, and consequently impair the effectiveness of the CE approach in 
promoting self-sustained success with GSS. To this end, the first research question of this study is: 
• How do facilitation practices, as coordination mechanisms, intervene with the interdependent 
decision making of GSS users and thereby contribute to GSS transition? 
 
In addition, a study about the coordination mechanisms in self-sustained GSS use can help us 
recognize the dynamic and adaptive aspects of GSS facilitation. Scripted facilitation has been 
criticized for a lack of adaptability (Anson et al., 1995). This can be attributed to the focus on 
technology and task management in extant CE practice. Compared with human interaction, task and 
technology characteristics are much more stable over time and, thus, facilitation routines for task and 
technology management rarely entail a dynamic dimension. On the other hand, group-level 
agreement on GSS use is an emergent property; it arises over time from the coordination of 
interdependent individual decisions about GSS use. Thus, facilitation practices, as coordination 
mechanisms, need to be adapted to the dynamic patterns of human interaction. An understanding of 
adaptive facilitation practices can help explain why an organization would eagerly embrace a GSS for 
two years and then abandon it (Briggs et al., 2003). Therefore, the second research question of this 
study is: 
• How should GSS facilitation be adapted—given the dynamic process of interdependent decision 
making inherent in GSS—and, thereby, stabilize GSS use? 
 
The dynamic, adaptive, and emergent characteristics of GSS transition make multi-agent modeling a 
proper approach for this study. The multi-agent framework is a lens through which we can see how 
interactions among adaptive individuals in a dynamic environment give rise to group level behaviors 
such as self-sustained GSS use. The interface between GSS transition and a multi-agent framework 
is in many ways natural and inevitable. At an abstract level, both deal with similar conceptual issues 
such as dynamic change, adaptation, and evolution of interacting parts in a system. Both seek 
answers for similar questions such as what are the multiple pathways by which structures can 
emerge, stabilize or change in systems? Ultimately, we employ the multi-agent simulator as a tool to 
uncover new insights and ask new questions that can help researchers perceive the issue of GSS 
transition in a fresh light.   
 
In the remainder of the paper, we first discuss the theoretical development and our propositions about 
contributions of facilitation as coordination mechanisms in self-sustained GSS use. Following the 
theoretical section, we describe the design, the calibration and the validation of the multi-agent 
simulator. Next, we discuss the experimentation in the multi-agent simulator and the insights gained 
through the experimentation process. Then, we suggest how the findings from multi-agent simulator 
can contribute to the CE literature and how the simulator can be utilized by the CE community to 
create knowledge.   
2. Theoretical Development 
In this section, we first discuss major technology transition models to provide background information 
for our study. Then, by borrowing insights from coordination theory, economics, and prior research on 
GSS, facilitation, and Collaboration Engineering, we formalize the human interactions underlying GSS 
transition as strategic behaviors in a game-theoretic coordination game (Roth, 1995; Van Huyck et al., 
1990; Camerer and Knez, 2000; Knez and Camerer, 1994; Cachon and Camerer, 1996; Chaudhuri et 
al., 2001). The contribution of facilitation is theorized as interventions during the course of the game.   
2.1. GSS Transition 
The obvious starting place for discussing GSS transition is the stream of research on user acceptance of 
new technology.  In the information system (IS) literature, models of technology acceptance are probably 
among the most mature research areas. Since several studies have provided thorough reviews of 
 
 
255 Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 10 Special Issue pp. 252-277 March 2009 
Nan&Johnston/Multi-Agent Simulation 
technology acceptance models (e.g., Venkatesh et al., 2003), our discussion here will highlight the main 
findings and focus on the connection between the individual-level acceptance models and GSS 
transition.   
 
Most theories and models about technology acceptance are focused on an individual user as the unit of 
analysis. The basic premise underlying these models is that an individual’s reactions to using information 
technology affect his or her intentions to use the technology, which consequently influences the actual 
use of the technology (Venkatesh et al., 2003). Based on the premise, different models have theorized a 
range of determinants of intention and/or use of technology. For example, the Technology Acceptance 
Model (TAM) (Davis, 1989; Davis et al., 1989) posits that perceived usefulness and perceived ease of 
use are of the primary user reactions to technology. They mediate the effects of external variables such 
as system characteristics and development process on intention to use a new technology. In the IS 
literature, TAM has been recognized as the most influential model explaining information technology 
acceptance (Venkatesh and Davis, 2000). In addition to the constructs defined in TAM, other models 
have proposed constructs such as attitude toward behavior, motivation to use technology, perceived 
behavioral control, affect toward use, and self-efficacy. 
 
Although most of the technology adoption models focus on individual user intention/usage, they hint at 
the importance of human interaction to technology transition by defining social influence (i.e., subjective 
norm) as a determinant of intended or actual use of technology. For example, based on the Theory of 
Reasoned Action and the Theory of Planned Behavior, the original TAM was expanded to take into 
account other people’s influence on a focal person’s intention or usage (Venkatesh and Davis, 2000). 
Specifically, the social influence factor, called subjective norm, is defined as a “person’s perception that 
most people who are important to him think he should or should not perform the behavior in question” 
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975, p. 302). This construct provides a rationale for us to explore human 
interactions in GSS transition. One thing to note is that the human interaction underlying subjective norm 
is different from that for coordination. First, subjective norm is a one-way interaction—others influence the 
focal user—while coordination involves two-way interaction—others influence and are influenced by the 
focal user.  Second, subjective norm affects how a focal user perceives the value of a technology, not the 
actual utility of the technology. In contrast, coordination in GSS transition affects how much value users 
gain from the technology.  
 
TAM has been employed in a few GSS studies. Researchers often find that TAM has limited applicability 
to group-level technology transition. For example, Dasgupta et al. (2002) adapted constructs from TAM 
to a laboratory study about the acceptance of a GSS application in an education setting. Contrary to the 
prediction of TAM, their findings showed that perceived usefulness has a negative impact on actual 
system usage. In another field study about GSS transition, Briggs et al. (1998) had to extend and modify 
constructs of TAM in order to account for the rich dynamics they observed in a group setting. They 
produced the Technology Transition Model (TTM) as an extension of TAM. In a later study, Briggs et al. 
(2003) summarized the main limitation of TAM: it does not account for how interactions among group 
members may lead to an agreement of GSS use and how the agreement can be sustained over time. 
The limitations of TAM and other individual-focused models necessitate alternative approaches or 
theories to study GSS transition. Among the alternatives, Collaboration Engineering and the critical mass 
view are particularly relevant to this study. 
 
Collaboration Engineering is an approach that specifically focuses on acceptance and use of GSS. 
Rather than focusing on an individual user’s perception, intention and use of technology, CE shifts 
attention to a key enabler of GSS transition, facilitation. CE researchers recognize that an essential 
difficulty in GSS transition is the lack of ongoing intervention provided by professional facilitators. To 
address this problem, CE researchers have attempted to codify and package best practices of facilitators 
so that practitioners can execute the facilitation routines on their own. Currently, CE researchers have 
documented approximately 70 such packaged facilitation routines (Kolfschoten et al., 2006), and have 
observed their effectiveness in achieving self-sustained GSS success in the field (Kolfschoten et al., 
2006).   
 
Critical mass has been suggested by several studies as an alternative perspective through which to 
examine GSS transition. For example, Fichman (1992) and Gallivan (2001) both proposed the critical 
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mass theory as a more appropriate framework than TAM in explaining group level acceptance of 
technology.  Grudin (1994) identified critical mass as a unique challenge to GSS transition. In AST, 
DeSanctis and Poole (1994) pointed out that the interdependence among GSS users’ values and 
behaviors is consistent with the notion of critical mass. Although few researchers have developed their 
suggestions into formal research models, they contribute to the literature by calling for research attention 
on the interactions of GSS users rather than the intention/use of individual users. These studies motivate 
our focus on the coordination of GSS users and the coordination mechanisms brought about by 
facilitation practices.      
 
A review of the technology acceptance literature reveals that self-sustained GSS use is a promising yet 
under-researched area. Up to now, few studies have formally characterized the coordination during GSS 
transition and how facilitation moderates the dynamics of coordination and eventually leads to self-
sustained GSS use. Based on AST, Figure 1 illustrates the complementary relationship between this 
study and the literature. Among technology, task, and human interaction, TAM and CE have offered 
insights into the impact of technology and task structures on GSS transition, while our focus is on the 
path from human interaction to GSS transition and the moderating effect of facilitation on the path. Below, 
we first theorize on the interdependent human interactions during GSS transition and then discuss the 
contributions of facilitation. 
 
Figure 1. The Complementary Relationship between This Study and the Literature 
Notes: The thin arrows are the focus of TAM and CE literature, while the thick arrows are the focus of 
this study. 
2.2. Coordination of GSS users 
As discussed in the introduction, achieving self-sustained GSS use can be articulated as a 
coordination problem for GSS users. In order to understand how facilitation contributes to the 
emergence and stabilization of the group-level agreement on GSS use, we need to first characterize 
the interdependent decision making of GSS users. Economic and social scholars have developed a 
family of coordination games to mathematically analyze the interdependencies among individuals and 
derive the group level outcomes. Among the family of coordination games, we employ a minimum 
effort coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria (see Appendix A for a tutorial), because it 
allows us to take into account the complexities in a GSS context, such as task/technology fit and 
asymmetry among group members in terms of effort invested in GSS use. Specifically, we 
characterize group members’ decisions about GSS adoption as the dilemma between reserving one’s 
own effort or investing the effort in adopting the GSS and taking the risk of wasting their effort if not 
enough coworkers adopt the same GSS. Meanwhile, because the efficiency of GSS varies across 
different tasks, in order to gain the most benefit, members have to simultaneously recognize the most 
efficient GSS for a given task and adopt the system together. In repeated play of this game, 
individuals adjust their choices based on the payoff of their past decisions. This allows self-sustained 
GSS use to emerge or collapse based on the dynamic interaction of individual decisions over time.     
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Experimental economists find that it is extremely difficult to achieve coordination success in minimum 
effort games with Pareto-ranked equilibria (see Weber, 2006 for a review). In relation to GSS 
transition, this means that it is difficult to achieve self-sustained GSS use. This finding helps to explain 
why GSS tend to be self-extinguishing (Briggs et al., 2003). To prevent coordination failure, 
economists have recognized two general interventions. The first intervention is to mechanistically 
focus players’ beliefs on a particular equilibrium, usually through pre-play communication (Cooper et 
al., 1992). This intervention helps players accept the risk of coordination and agree to choose the 
Pareto optimal action. The second intervention is to reduce the tension between individual risk and 
group efficiency by changing the payoff structure of a coordination game (Cooper et al., 1990; Van 
Huyck et al., 1990). This approach makes the Pareto optimal action less risky and more attractive and, 
thereby, induces more coordination success. Based on prior findings of interventions in the minimum-
effort coordination game, the premise of this paper is that the coordination mechanisms of GSS 
facilitation intervene with the interdependent decision making of GSS users by (1) reducing 
uncertainty about other members’ choices of GSS feature (i.e., help members accept the risk of 
coordination) and (2) reducing uncertainty about the potential value of a chosen GSS for a given task 
(i.e., make the Pareto optimal action less risky).  The section below elaborates on this premise. 
2.3. GSS Facilitation 
According to Hayne (1999, p. 73), facilitation is defined as:  
1. to make easier or less difficult; help forward; an action, a process;  
2. a set of factors or behaviors carried out before, during, and after a meeting to help a group 
achieve its goals;  
3. moving from the known to the unknown. 
 
It is implied that facilitation is not confined to services provided by professional facilitators. Any factor 
or behavior that helps a group achieve GSS transition can be considered facilitation, regardless 
whether it is brought about by a facilitator, a trainer, a leader, or a software program. Our theorization 
of facilitation is in this broad sense. 
 
Past research has shown that there are multiple approaches for facilitation to affect GSS acceptance 
and use. We summarize the facilitation routines observed in prior studies in Table 1. Among the 
variety of facilitation approaches, we identify and focus on four basic practices. The first is GSS 
championing (e.g., Nunamaker et al., 1991; George et al., 1992), which can be performed by a 
facilitator or a group leader. This practice can boost users’ enthusiasm and the perceived 
effectiveness of GSS and thus promote GSS use.  The second practice is restricting GSS choices 
(e.g., Hayne, 1999; Dennis et al., 2001), usually done by using highly restrictive software. This 
practice “forces” members to achieve self-sustained GSS use by minimizing alternative ways of GSS 
use. The third practice is task and technology help (e.g., Griffith et al., 1998; Dennis and Garfield, 
2003). This is usually provided by professional facilitators. By directly intervening in how users employ 
GSS to perform tasks, facilitators can improve task/technology fit and enable members to leverage 
more benefits from GSS. The fourth practice is training (e.g., Dennis et al., 2001; Dennis and Garfield, 
2003), which can be provided by a trainer or a facilitator. By educating members about the structures 
and use of GSS, “it moves the group more quickly down the gradual path to the stabilization of 
appropriate structures and habitual routines” (Dennis et al., 2001, p. 173). 
 
The four basic facilitation practices can be mapped onto the two general interventions of coordination 
failure in a minimum-effort game: (1) reducing uncertainty about other members’ choice of GSS 
feature and (2) reducing uncertainty about the potential values of chosen GSS for a given task. 
Specifically, both championing and restricting reduce the uncertainty about others’ GSS use by 
increasing members’ willingness to coordinate and mechanically focusing members’ choice on a few 
GSS features, respectively. Meanwhile, task and technology help reduces the uncertainty about the 
value of a chosen GSS for a given task by directly intervening with the task and technology match 
during group meetings. Training reduces the same uncertainty by enabling group members to make 
sensible use of GSS for a given task on their own. The mapping from the common facilitation 
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Table 1: GSS Facilitation Practices1 Identified in the Literature   
Study GSS Facilitation Practices 
 
Nunamaker et al., 1991; 
George et al., 1992 
* Reduce technical complexity by initiating 
and terminating specific software tools (3) 
* Training (4) 
* Champion/sponsor of GSSs (1) 
 
Dickson et al., 1993 
* Chauffeur-driven support (helps the group 
with the technology) (3) 
* Facilitator-driven support (helps the group 
with the process and the technology) (3) 
 
Clawson et al., 1993 
* Selects and prepares technology (3) 
* Creates comfort with technology (3) 
* Understands technology and its capabilities 
(4) 
 
Anson et al., 1995 
* positively influence people’s perceptions of 
GSS effectiveness (1) 
* help people better understand and organize 
their use of GSSs (3, 4) 
Orlikowski and Yates, 1995 * Metastructuring, i.e., direct intervention into GSS use process (3) 
 
 
Niederman et al., 1996 
* encourage GSS adoption through good 
matching of tools to tasks (3) 
* demonstrate GSS’s added value (1) 
* provide “low-key” technology that allows 
group members to focus on tasks (3) 
 
 
Griffith et al., 1998 
* ensure the advantages of GSSs are 
accessible to group members (3) 
* run the technology for group members (3) 
* assist those members who are not masters 
of the technology (3) 
Boiney, 1998 * Explain the use and purpose of GSS capabilities and options (4) 
 
Hayne, 1999 
* Selecting the technology that fits a group’s 
goal (3) 
* Take care of logistics of technology use (3) 
* Restrictiveness (2) 
Niederman and Volkema, 1999 * Explain operations of GSS (4) 
 
Dennis et al., 2001 
* Direct intervention into GSS use process (3) 
* Restrictive GSS (2) 
* Training (4) 
 
Vreede et al., 2002a, b 
 
* Choose and prepare GSS technology (2) 
* Introduce GSS to users (4) 
* Being available during GSS use process (3) 
* Structure the GSS use process (3)  
Dennis and Garfield, 2003 * Starting the GSS (3) * Training (4) 
Notes: numbers in parentheses indicate the basic facilitation practices they relate to. 1. champion; 
2. restrict choice; 3. task and technology help; 4. training. 
 
                                                     
1 We only focus on the facilitation practices related to GSS transition.  Facilitation relates directly to the problem 
being discussed in a group meeting is not the focus of this study. 
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Figure 2. The Multiple Pathways of GSS Facilitation 
 
Proposition 1: Facilitation as a coordination mechanism can induce self-sustained GSS 
use by reducing uncertainties through multiple pathways.    
 
Due to the multiple pathways for achieving self-sustained GSS use, the effectiveness of facilitation 
practices may vary at different points in the GSS transition lifecycle. Facilitation practices that directly 
change how GSS users perceive or use the technology in tasks may be more effective in the initial 
phase of GSS transition, because they do not require users to spend time learning functions of GSS. 
On the other hand, facilitation practices that help users truly understand GSS may be more effective 
in the long run, because they sustain GSS use by stabilizing the habitual routines of GSS users 
(Johnson and Rice, 1987; Dennis and Garfield, 2003). For example, restricting may work better than 
training to initiate GSS use, because it mechanically forces GSS users to adopt the same system 
 
Figure 3. A Possible Pattern of Effectiveness of Different Facilitation Practices in 
GSS Transition Lifecycle 
Notes: The shapes of the function lines are fictional; they are not part of our proposition. 
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rather than gradually helps users voluntarily choose the same GSS. However, in the long run, training 
may become more effective, because training empowers GSS users to make sensible use of the 
technology without the ongoing intervention of facilitators. Figure 3 shows a possible pattern of 
effectiveness for different facilitation practices over time.   
Proposition 2: Different facilitation practices can have varied effectiveness in initiating 
and sustaining GSS use during the lifecycle of GSS transition.  
In summary, an integration of AST, experimental economics, and GSS research suggests that facilitation 
practices, as coordination mechanisms, intervene with the interdependent decision making of GSS users 
by reducing the uncertainties in the coordination problem; effectiveness of facilitation practices may vary 
during the lifecycle of GSS transition due to the different pathways for facilitation to induce self-sustained 
GSS use. The propositions offer a basis for CE researchers to evaluate the causal mechanisms 
underlying the common facilitation practices (P1), and to understand how to adapt them to the dynamic 
process of GSS user coordination during GSS transition (P2). 
3. Method 
We employ multi-agent modeling to examine the contributions of facilitation to self-sustained GSS use. A 
multi-agent model (also called bottom-up modeling or artificial social systems) is an emerging paradigm 
to analyze how heterogeneous, autonomous behaviors of actors/agents generate global macroscopic 
regularities of social phenomena (Epstein, 1999). In a multi-agent model, “fundamental social structures 
and group behaviors emerge from the interaction of individuals operating in artificial environments under 
rules that place only bounded demands on each agent’s information and computational capacity” 
(Epstein and Axtell, 1996, p. 4). Essentially, multi-agent modeling helps us understand how repeated 
interactions among actors give rise to collective behaviors in an entire system. It has been employed to 
study a variety of social, economic, and organizational issues such as information diffusion and social 
change (Carley, 1991), exchange of goods in a market (Epstein and Axtell, 1996), media and 
organizational culture and performance (Canessa and Riolo, 2003), transactive memory in teams (Ren et 
al., 2006), and knowledge transfer in organizations (Cataldo and Carley, 2001).   
 
Compared with traditional social science paradigms such as statistical estimating and differential 
equations, a multi-agent framework has five unique characteristics. First, it takes a bottom-up 
approach. Rather than seeking a centralized control mechanism for orderly behaviors of a system, a 
multi-agent framework explores whether decentralized interactions among autonomous actors can 
lead to system-level regularities. Second, a multi-agent framework assumes that actors engage in 
adaptive rather than fully rational behaviors (Axelrod, 1997). Actors with limited information and 
foresight optimize their strategies through interacting with others. Third, a multi-agent framework 
allows heterogeneity among actors, whereas traditional social scientists often suppress agent 
heterogeneity in order to make their models tractable (Epstein and Axtell, 1996). Fourth, multi-agent 
modeling focuses on dynamic processes that produce or disrupt equilibria rather than the static 
nature of equilibria (Epstein and Axtell, 1996). Last, traditional statistical or multi-equation modeling 
assumes linear, deterministic, or independent relationships among parameters, whereas a multi-agent 
framework explicitly takes into account nonlinear, nondeterministic, and interdependent interactions 
among multiple levels of actors. These unique characteristics make it a valuable approach to examine 
the decentralized, dynamic, and adaptive human interactions underlying GSS use and the multiple 
pathways for facilitation to induce critical mass to spur GSS transition. 
 
In addition, the computational modeling approach offers several advantages compared with 
laboratory experiments or field studies. First, it gives researchers precision and control in the 
measurement and manipulation of crucial variables. As pointed out by Conway et al. (1959, p. 105), 
“in physical experimentation stochastic variability is, by definition, that which lies beyond the control of 
the experimenter; simulated experimentation, the stochastic variability, like every other feature of the 
model, is deliberately and explicitly placed there by the constructor. Second, it is a more manageable 
way to study time-dependent and time-consuming processes such as GSS transition. A computer 
simulation can collect longitudinal data more efficiently than a lab or field study (Arrow et al., 2000). 
Moreover, as dynamic patterns are not easily described verbally, a computer simulation can visually 
present important temporal features of a process in a step-by-step manner (Drazin and Sandelands, 
 
 
261 Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 10 Special Issue pp. 252-277 March 2009 
Nan&Johnston/Multi-Agent Simulation 
1992). Third, a computational approach provides a very effective method to answer “what if” questions 
(Romme, 2004). Researchers can explore a wide range of possible contingencies that are hard to 
implement in lab experiments or field studies due to legal, ethical, or practical reasons. Last but not 
the least, in order to translate theories and concepts to computational programmable systems, we 
have to specify the causal mechanisms underlying facilitation practices and critical mass of GSS 
transition. This makes computational modeling a very helpful approach for CE researchers to identify 
the causal elements of packaged facilitation routines.   
 
Of course, due to the complexities of reality, it is not possible to mimic every aspect of the real world 
in the computational environment. Therefore, we must, to quote Simon (1990, p. 7), "separate what is 
essential from what is dispensable in order to capture in our models a simplified picture of  reality, 
which nevertheless will allow us to make inferences that are important to our goals.” The goal of our 
multi-agent simulation is neither normative (it does not assume idealistic rationality) nor descriptive (it 
does not replicate the rich details of a GSS supported work group), but exploratory. If the simulation 
produces results that can inform the causal mechanisms or adaptive aspects of common facilitation 
practices, it gives us some grounds to believe that the multi-agent modeling method is a useful 
approach to uncover new insights about GSS transition issues. By excluding many factors, we can be 
sure that their presence does not cause the observed output. What is lost in the level of detail is 
gained in the degree of control over the research environment (Prietula et al., 1998). Thus, we take a 
parsimonious approach in the multi-agent modeling and only simulate the factors that are both 
essential to our research questions and well understood in the literature.  
 
In general, the multi-agent model is an artifact constructed within the design science approach 
(Hevner et al., 2004). It is not aimed to be a full-grown information system that can be used in 
practice.  Instead, the artifact provides a way for the GSS transition problem to be conceived by CE 
researchers. As Simon states, “Solving a problem simply means representing it so as to make the 
solution transparent” (1996, p. 132).  
3.1. The Multi-Agent Model Design 
Based on the theory of multi-agent modeling (Epstein and Axtell, 1996), interactions among GSS 
facilities, users, and facilitation practices are reduced into four building blocks of a multi-agent model: 
agents, properties or attributes of agents, environment, and behavioral rules. The first building block, 
agents, is the actors in a system. In our model of work groups, agents are members of a work group. 
The number of agents in the model is controlled by the parameter, group size. 
 
The second building block, properties or attributes of agents, is their internal states and 
characteristics. In our model, agents have three attributes: belief about others’ GSS use (referred to 
as belief), probability of task/technology fit (referred to as task/tech fit), and learning. Belief represents 
the uncertainty of other members’ GSS choice. It is a value ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values 
meaning lower uncertainty. Belief of each agent is randomly drawn from a normal distribution with 
mean 0.75 and standard deviation 0.2 (more details later on the calibration of these values). If the 
random draw produces a number less than 0 or greater than 1, we set it to 0 or 1, respectively. 
Task/tech fit reflects the uncertainty about the potential value of a chosen GSS for a given task. It 
varies from 0 to 1, with higher values for lower uncertainty. Learning reflects members’ true 
understanding about GSS functions.  It is a value from 0 to 1, with a higher value for better 
understanding. The initial value of learning is randomly drawn from the uniform distribution between 0 
and 1 to represent a diversity of users’ familiarity with GSS. In general, the value of task/tech fit 
equals learning, unless agents receive task and technology help (more details on this facilitation rule 
later). This represents the situation where members’ ability to match task with GSS is based on their 
understanding of the technology, unless there is direct intervening from a facilitator.  
 
The third building block, the environment, is the medium over which agents operate and interact. It is 
separate from the agents but interacts with them.  In our model, the environment represents the GSS. 
It offers benefits (payoffs) to agents based on the coordination outcome. If agents achieve agreement 
about GSS use, each agent receives a GSS payoff. If agents fail to adopt the same GSS, those who 
did not choose to use the GSS receive a defector payoff (representing their reserved effort), and 
those who attempted to use the GSS receive a loser payoff (representing their wasted effort). In the 
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framework of a minimum-effort coordination game, the GSS payoff is always higher than the defector 
payoff, which in turn is higher than the loser payoff (Skyrms, 2004). Following the payoff structure of 
the coordination game and based on model calibration results, we assign the payoff values as shown 
in Table 2.      
Table 2: Payoffs of the GSS Facility 
 The Collective Choices 
of Other Agents 
GSS Other Technology 
Individual 
Agent’s Choice 
GSS GSS Payoff (10) Loser Payoff (0) 
Other 
Technology Defector Payoff (3) Defector Payoff (3) 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are the values used in the simulation. 
The last building block, behavior rules, defines the movements, interactions, and changes of internal 
states of agents and the environment. To this study, behavioral rules are the most important 
component of the multi-agent model because they reflect our conjectured mechanisms underlying the 
facilitation practices in GSS transition. We implement four behavioral rules to represent the four basic 
facilitation practices identified in the literature: the champion rule, the restrict rule, the task and 
technology help rule, and the training rule.   
 
The champion rule increases the average belief of agents by a certain percentage set by the 
simulator users. For example, if belief of agents was initially drawn from a normal distribution with 
mean 0.75, and the increase percentage was set to 20 percent, the champion rule will increase the 
distribution mean to 0.95. Thus, uncertainty of others’ GSS use is reduced, and agents are more likely 
to choose the GSS. The restrict rule also affects belief of agents, but in a different fashion. When the 
restrict rule is in effect, belief of agents is changed from its current value to 1 (i.e., uncertainty about 
others’ GSS choice is minimized). This reflects the empirical finding that restricting can mechanically 
focus members’ beliefs on particular GSS features by limiting the choices available.   
 
The task and technology help rule increases the value of task/tech fit to 1 regardless of agents’ 
learning. It reflects the direct intervening of facilitators to help members choose appropriate GSS 
features for a given task. The training rule increases the value of learning at a fast speed. It 
represents the effect of training on improving members’ true understanding of GSS use. The other 
three facilitation rules also improve learning, but at a slower speed. This mimics group members’ 
independent learning as a “by-product” of using GSS. The actual values of the learning speed with 
training or without training are set by the simulator users. Table 3 aligns the basic facilitation practices 
and their corresponding behavioral rules in the model.  
In a round of the model play, agents simultaneously make a choice to use GSS or not, receive payoff 
based on their choices and the collective choice of the group, and then update their belief and 
learning. 
 
When agents make a choice about GSS use, they calculate the expected value of using GSS with the 
following equation:   
Expected value of GSS = (my belief of others’ choice) ^ number of other agents * GSS payoff * 
task/tech fit2 
Essentially, the equation above captures two things: the payoff of GSS use and the likelihood of GSS 
use by the whole group. The payoff of GSS use is defined in Table 2. The likelihood of GSS use 
encompasses two uncertainties: (1) whether other members will choose the same GSS and (2) 
whether the chosen GSS fits the task at hand. In the equation, the first uncertainty is calculated as the 
focal agent’s belief of others’ choice raised to the power of the number of other agents. The second 
uncertainty is reflected by the task/tech fit variable. 
                                                     
2The value of task/tech fit equals the learning value, unless the task and technology help rule is in effect. 
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Table 3: Alignment between Previous Observations and the Behavioral Rules 




Increase members’ enthusiasm 
and perceived effectiveness of 
GSS (e.g., Nunamaker et al., 
1991; George et al., 1992) 
Increase the average belief of 




Mechanically focus members’ 
choice on particular GSS 
features (e.g., Hayne, 1999; 
Dennis et al., 2001) 
Increase belief of agents about 
others’ GSS use to 1 
 
Task and 
 Technology Help 
Intervene in the task and 
technology match during group 
meetings (e.g., Dickson et al., 
1993; Clawson et al., 1993) 
 




Educate members about the 
functions of GSS (e.g., Boiney, 
1998; Dennis and Garfield, 
2003) 
Increase learning at a greater 
speed than the other facilitation 
rules 
 
If the expected value of GSS is greater than the defector payoff, the agent will choose to use the GSS.  
Otherwise, the agent will choose to defect (not use the GSS). If all of the agents choose to use the 
GSS, the round results in GSS use. On the other hand, if some agents choose not to use GSS, the 
round results in coordination failure. Agents will receive payoffs according to Table 2.   
 
At the end of each round, agents update their belief and learning based on the outcome. If the round 
achieves GSS use, each agent updates his or her belief using the following calculation: 
Updated-belief = current-belief + ((1 – current-belief) * belief-changing-speed) 
 
The above equation captures the concave effect of a GSS use outcome; that is, every time the group 
of agents achieves GSS use, their belief about others choosing the same GSS in the future increases. 
Meanwhile, the marginal effect of each additional GSS use outcome decreases as the belief value 
approaches 1. 
 
If the round results in coordination failure, agents update their belief using:  
Updated-belief = current-belief – (current-belief * belief-changing-speed) 
 
This equation reflects the convex effect of coordination failures. Specifically, agents reduce their belief 
that others will adopt the GSS when they fail to achieve GSS use. The impairing effect of coordination 
failure diminishes as the belief value approaching 0.   
 
Meanwhile, if the training rule is in effect, agents will update their learning using: 
Updated-learning = current-learning + ((1 – current-learning) * learning-speed-with-training) 
If the training rule in not in effect, agents will update their learning with: 
Updated-learning = current-learning + ((1 – current-learning) * learning-speed-without-training) 
Both learning update equations produce concave learning curves: each round of model play helps 
agents to be more experienced in choosing the appropriate GSS for a given task; the more 
experienced agents become, the less improvement they can make with each additional round of 
model play. As discussed earlier, the learning speed is faster when the training rule is in effect. The 
different learning speeds are reflected by the different parameters (learning-speed-with-training vs. 
learning-speed-without-training) in the two equations. 
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The decision, belief, and learning update functions of the model indicate that the behavior of agent is 
adaptive rather than fully rational. Each agent only has information about his or her own belief and 
learning ability. Each has no knowledge of the global distribution of others’ beliefs or learning. After 
each round of game play, agents only know their own choice and the collective outcome. They do not 
know the specific choice of any other agent. Unlike fully rational actors, who would directly reach an 
equilibrium in the coordination game based on mathematical analysis of the payoff structure, agents 
in our model gradually converge to an equilibrium of the coordination game by adjusting their choices 
based on the history of the game play.   
 
The simulator user can control the number of rounds in the game play. A greater number of rounds 
mimics a longer time span of GSS transition. The simulator has the capability to turn a certain 
facilitation rule on or off at any point in a simulation session. Thus, as the users of the simulator, we 
can examine whether a particular facilitation rule or a combination of several facilitation rules can 
induce self-sustained GSS use and how their effectiveness changes at different points in the GSS 
transition. Our multi-agent simulator is created in Netlogo (Wilensky, 1999), and its interface is shown 
in Figure 4. The interface comprises five main areas: model controls, experiment controls, calibration 





Figure 4. The Interface of the Simulator 
 
The model controls are used to set up and run an individual experiment. A simulator user will first 
determine under what conditions he would like to test for the model and then set up the experiment. 
To run one round, the user hits the “go” button. To slowly proceed through a round, the user uses the 
step button to see the interactions at each stage. In the experiment controls section, a user can run 
many rounds and look at the aggregated results. As discussed above, the user will set up the 
conditions to be tested and the number of rounds to test the model on. The monitors in the lower left 
of the interface show the cumulative results. The calibration parameters are part of the experimental 
conditions but have been tested based on previous literature.  Users can modify these values to see 
for themselves how group size and initial starting beliefs change the nature of the outcomes. The 
justification for the specific variable settings in our simulation is discussed in detail in the model 
calibration section. The facilitator practices are what we are exploring in this paper. Each practice can 
be turned on or off at any time and in any combination. The display is a window on the experiment, 
which shows each agent as a person shape. The colors of the agents show their choice in the game: 
A red agent has chosen NOT to use the GSS and a blue player has chosen to use the GSS. In 
addition, the brightness of the agents indicates how adamantly they made the decisions. For instance, 
a barely visible red agent is more likely to switch to blue than a bright red agent. Each agent also has 
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an outward link to every other player and an inward link from every other agent. These links maintain 
each agent’s current belief about how likely he thinks the other agent is to choose a GSS in question. 
The brightness of the lines is a visual clue to show the strength of the belief. The display updates after 
each round in a simulation session to reflect the current state of the simulation.  
3.2. Model Validation 
“Learning" from research using a computational model requires two stages. The first stage is to 
understand the behavior of the simulator itself in terms of the properties and behavioral rules. This is 
the focus of the section above on model design.  The second stage is to translate learning from the 
simulation to learning about the actual process.  This is generally viewed as the focus of the 
validation process. Validation “is the process of building an acceptable level of confidence that an 
inference about a simulated process is a correct or valid inference for the actual process” (Van Horn, 
1971, p. 247). Rarely will validation result in a "proof" that the simulation is a correct or "true" model of 
the real world. The two important characteristics of the validation problem are: 
1. The objective is to validate a set of new insights rather than the mechanism that generated the 
insights. 
2. Validation is problem-dependent.  There is no such thing as "the" appropriate validation 
procedure (Van Horn, 1971).  
 
Figure 5. The Three-Stage Validation Process 
 
In social science, an approach that has been recommended and performed in a number of simulation 
studies (e.g., Naylor and Finger, 1967; Weitzel et al., 2006; Carley, 1996; Kane and Alavi, 2007) is a 
three-stage validation process (see Figure 5 for the process in our study). The first stage is grounding. 
It focuses on the reasonableness of the causal relations in the simulation model and the fit of the 
model with existing theories. The grounding of our multi-agent model was largely addressed in the 
discussion about GSS transition, the coordination challenge, and facilitation practices. The behavioral 
rules of the simulation model are specifically based on the facilitation routines identified in the 
literature, and the interaction among agents is rationalized by the well-established coordination game 
theory in economics. 
 
The second stage of the validation process is calibration. It is an iterative process of improving the fit of 
the parameter values in the model to the empirical observations available. The parameters of our model 
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include group size, GSS/defector/loser payoffs, the mean and standard deviation of belief and the belief 
changing speed. These parameters define the context of GSS facilitation rather than directly represent 
the facilitation rules. Although variations of the parameter values do affect the simulation results, they are 
not the focus of our research questions. In the calibration process, we seek the set of parameter values 
that allows us to see the significance of different facilitation practices and variations of their effectiveness 
over the lifecycle of GSS transition. 
 
To calibrate reasonable values for the parameters, we ran the simulation model 1000 times for each 
of the possible combinations of different values of the parameters (see Johnston, 2006 and Johnston, 
2007 for more details). We then compared the results to findings taken from the last 17 years of 
experimental research in coordination within different size groups in minimum-effort games (Van 
Huyck et al., 1990; Camerer and Knez, 2000; Knez and Camerer, 1994; Cachon and Camerer, 1996; 
Chaudhuri et al., 2001; Weber, 2006).  Out of the possible configurations of parameter values, the 
setting with the mean belief 0.75, the standard deviation 0.2, the belief changing speed 0.75, GSS 
payoff 10, defector payoff 3, loser payoff 0, and group size 10 produced the best fit with the prior 
findings. 
 
The last stage is verification, which is the process of demonstrating the reasonableness of the 
simulation results and the fit of the results to real world observations. Because there is rarely an 
existing real world counterpart for every simulated condition, we cannot demonstrate the consistency 
of all variations in the simulation and all real world conditions (otherwise, we do not need to use 
simulation). Verification usually involves showing—for at least a few versions of the simulated system 
and the comparable conditions in real world—that the simulator produces results not inconsistent with 
the performance of the real system.  Certainly, the match between a few variations of simulation and 
real world conditions does little to establish the virtue of other variations of the model. Thus, this 
widely applied and accepted test is essentially a null test: a model that failed to pass would be 
exceedingly suspect, but a model passed is not proved to be valid (Conway et al., 1959).  Ultimately, 
verification is aimed at improving our faith in the insights gained from the simulation. 
 
We perform model verification after conducting experiments with the multi-agent simulation. For the 
results produced by the simulation experiment, we look for comparable empirical findings in the 
literature and see whether the implications from the simulation and the empirical findings are 
consistent.  More details on model verification are presented at the end of the results section. 
 
As indicated by Figure 5, the three-stage validation process is not an isolated step in our research 
program. Instead, it is a persistent concern throughout this study and, thus, the process of validation 
is “embedded” as part of the theoretical development (grounding), model design (calibration), and 
result discussion (verification).   
3.3. Experimentation in the Multi-Agent Model 
We conduct a full factorial design experiment to explore the separate and combined effects of the 
facilitation rules. The goal of the experiment is twofold. First, we intend to gain insights into the 
propositions about facilitation practices. Second, we attempt to illustrate the value of the multi-agent 
simulation as an approach to gain new knowledge and ask new questions about the GSS transition 
issue. Table 4 lists the dimensions and the levels of each dimension of the factorial design experiment.  
This design results in 92,160 factorial conditions for the simulation experiment. A factor worth mentioning 
is egress of facilitation. This dimension of the factorial design is intended to test the sustainability of 
facilitation practices. By terminating the facilitation rules at different points in the GSS transition lifecycle, 
we can see how effective the facilitation rules are in inducing self-sustained use of GSS.  
The outcome measure of the experiment is the likelihood of achieving self-sustained GSS use (i.e., the 
number of sessions achieving GSS use in the last round divided by the total number of sessions in a 
factorial condition). By comparing the likelihood values across different factorial conditions, we can 
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Table 4: The Factorial Design Experiment 
Dimension Level Number of Levels 
The champion rule Present, Absent 2 
The restrict rule Present, Absent 2 
The task and tech help rule Present, Absent 2 
The training rule Present, Absent 2 
The percentage  
Increase of belief resulted from 
the champion rule 





0.6, 0.65, 0.7, 0.75, 0.8, 0.85  6 
Learning-speed- 
without-training 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5 4 
Total rounds of game play 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,12, 13, 14,15 10 
Egress of facilitation 
after the specified round 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 6 
Total Number of Factorial Conditions 92,160 
Notes: The numbers in bold are the set of variable settings we selected for result 
reporting 
4. Results 
We performed 100 sessions of simulation in each of the 92,160 factorial conditions. To scope down 
the results for reporting, we first selected a subset of factorial conditions that could effectively 
represent variations in facilitation effects. Specifically, we chose the factorial conditions with 20 
percent as the increase in belief resulted from the champion rule, 0.75 as the learning-speed-with-
training, 0.5 as the learning-speed-without-training, and 12 as the total rounds of game play. 
Conditions with other settings of the variables either did not generate enough variations for further 
examination, or produced results that were consistent with the selected subset. 
 
In the selected subset of factorial conditions, we identified several interesting patterns in the 
simulation results. First, 11 out of the 16 possible combinations of the facilitation rules can induce 
GSS use. However, their effectiveness varies. Each facilitation rule alone is generally ineffective in 
producing self-sustained GSS use. Among all the combinations of two facilitation practices, the 
restrict rule and the task and technology help rule together are associated with the highest likelihood 
of a GSS use outcome. A combination of at least three facilitation practices can always induce some 
GSS use outcomes. We list the 16 combinations and their experiment outcomes in Table 5. In the 
table, each row with a non-zero likelihood outcome represents an effective portfolio of facilitation 
practices to induce GSS use. By the model design, we know precisely the causal pathway underlying 
each practice in the facilitation portfolios. Overall, findings in Table 5 offer a fine-grained 
understanding of the relative effects of the multiple pathways for facilitation to induce GSS use.   
 
When allowing facilitation rules to terminate in the middle of a simulation session, we found that the 
sustainability of the facilitation rules varied. In general, the training rule enhances the sustainability of 
other facilitation rules.  As shown in Table 6, the likelihood of reaching self-sustained GSS use tends 
to be higher when the training rule is present before we terminated all the other facilitation rules. We 
performed two-sample proportion tests to compare the likelihood of achieving self-sustained GSS use 
with and without the training rule (see Table 6 for the p values).  Moreover, the longer the training rule 
remained in a simulation session, the more likely a self-sustained GSS use outcome occurs.  For 
example, for the combination of the restrict, task and technology help, and the training rules, 
facilitation egress after the first round failed to result in any self-sustained GSS use outcome, while 
egress after the second round generated a 30 percent GSS use outcomes.   
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Table 5: Experiment Results of Combinations of the Facilitation Rules 
Restrict Champion Task and Tech Help Training 
Likelihood of GSS Use 
  yes yes 1% 
  yes  0 
   yes 0 
    0 
 yes yes yes 2% 
 yes yes  4% 
 yes  yes 0 
 yes   0 
yes  yes yes 100% 
yes  yes  100% 
yes   yes 6% 
yes    4% 
yes yes yes yes 99% 
yes yes yes  100% 
yes yes  yes 4% 
yes yes   7% 
Notes: “yes” means presence of the rule, while a blank cell means absence of the rule. 
 













% p % p 
  yes yes 0 na 0 na   yes  0 0 
   yes 0 na 0 na     0 0 
 yes yes yes 5 0.37 7 0.04*  yes yes  4 2 
 yes  yes 0 na 0 na  yes   0 0 
yes  yes yes 0 na 30 0.002** 
yes  yes  0 13 
yes   yes 0 na 6 0.15 yes    0 3 
yes yes yes yes 22 0.006** 91 0.13 yes yes yes  9 86 
yes yes  yes 1 0.5 3 0.65 yes yes   1 4 
Notes: “yes” means presence of the rule while a blank cell means absence of the 
rule.  * for significance at 0.05 and ** for significance at 0.01. 
  
The varied sustainability of the facilitation rules motivated us to ask a new question: Does the timing 
of the presence of a facilitation practice modify its sustainability? We conducted a follow-up 
experiment with the facilitation rules present in the last two rounds of a simulation session (see Table 
7 for results). We found that the timing of the presence of facilitation matters. When facilitation is 
made available in the last 2 rounds of a simulation session, the likelihood of achieving a GSS use 
outcome tends to be much lower than in the cases when the facilitation rules are present in the first 
two rounds of a session. This implies that the earlier GSS users can receive facilitation, the better the 
GSS transition outcome may be. Results in Table 7 also indicate that the restrict rule becomes pivotal 
in the late presence of facilitation. Meanwhile, the training rule does not seem to make much 
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difference when made available later in a simulation session. An insight gained here is that later in the 
GSS transition process, when users’ belief in GSS use has been substantially “damaged” by 
coordination failures, the facilitation practices that boost users’ belief are more important than those 
that help them understand the technology. 
Table 7: Experiment Results of Late Presence of the Facilitation Rules 
Restrict Champion Task and  Tech Help Training 
Likelihood of GSS 
Use 
  yes yes 0 
  yes  0 
   yes 0 
    0 
 yes yes yes 0 
 yes yes  0 
 yes  yes 0 
 yes   0 
yes  yes yes 5% 
yes  yes  1% 
yes   yes 3% 
yes    3% 
yes yes yes yes 3% 
yes yes yes  6% 
yes yes  yes 2% 
yes yes   1% 
Notes: “yes” means presence of the rule, while a blank cell means absence of 
the rule. 
 
Table 8: Model Verification 
Findings in 
Real World Settings 
Findings in  
the Simulation Conditions 
GSS facilities are self-extinguishing 
(Briggs et al., 2003) 
Absence of the facilitation rules 
results in zero GSS use outcome 
Some initial training alone is ineffective in 
inducing GSS transition  
(Dickson et al., 1993) 
Presence of the training rule alone 
results in zero GSS use outcome 
A combination of training and restrictive 
GSS can lead to self-sustained GSS use 
(Hayne, 1999) 
A combination of the training and 
the restrict rule can induce 6% 
likelihood of a GSS use outcome 
Experiential learning is important for users 
to adapt GSS to their work processes 
(Dennis and Garfield, 2003) 
The training rule can enhance the 
sustainability of other facilitation 
effects 
 
Organizations would eagerly embrace a 
GSS facility for two years and then 
abandon it (Briggs et al., 2003) 
Several facilitation portfolios (e.g., 
the restrict rule, or the restrict and 
the task and technology help rules 
combined) cannot produce self-
sustained GSS use after the 
facilitation rules are terminated 
 
Early presentation of a GSS to users is 
important (Orlikowski, 2000) 
Facilitation provided in the first two 
rounds is more effective in 
inducing self-sustained GSS use 
than that provided in the last two 
rounds of a simulation session 
 
Taken together, the findings help us achieve the two goals for multi-agent simulation. First, they offer 
us a more sophisticated view of the contributions of facilitation to self-sustained GSS use. We not 
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only gain insights into the relative effect of different portfolios of facilitation practices (in relation to P1), 
but also recognize that the effects may vary depending on the available duration and timing of the 
facilitation practices (in relation to P2). Second, the findings indicate the value of the multi-agent 
modeling approach.  The fact that we could conduct a large-scale full factorial design longitudinal 
experiment shows that the multi-agent simulation is a manageable approach to study dynamic social 
processes. The follow-up experiment about the late presence of facilitation rules further indicates that 
the multi-agent method is effective in answering “what if” questions.   
 
As the last stage of the model validation, we revisit the GSS literature to look for comparable findings 
for the simulation results. As discussed earlier, it is usually impossible to find a real world counterpart 
for every condition in the simulation. Thus, we perform the model verification for a selected set of 
results for which we could identify related findings in the literature. The comparison between the 
simulation and the empirical results is presented in Table 8. In general, we do not see any significant 
inconsistencies between the two sets of findings.  The model verification enhances our confidence in 
the insights gained from the multi-agent model. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this study, we apply the multi-agent framework to understand the contributions of facilitation as a 
coordination mechanism in GSS transition. By formalizing the interdependent decision making of 
GSS users as strategic behaviors in a minimum-effort coordination game, we interpret the 
contributions of facilitation as interventions to coordination failures in the game play. We develop a 
multi-agent simulator to gain insights into the propositions about facilitation practices. Through the 
simulation experimentation, we find separate and combined effects of the basic facilitation practices 
at different points in a GSS transition lifecycle.   
 
The findings from the multi-agent simulation offer several important implications for CE research and 
practice. First, CE researchers can employ the multiple pathway view of the facilitation practices to 
examine the causal mechanisms underlying best facilitation practices identified in the field.  
Recognizing the specific causal pathways helps CE researchers to codify the core and most effective 
collections of facilitation routines. Second, this study calls for attention to the adaptive dimension of 
facilitation routines. The simulation results show that some facilitation practices such as restricting 
GSS use may be effective in initiating GSS use, but not in sustaining the facilitation benefit. In 
contrast, facilitation practices such as training may not appear to be helpful when used alone, but are 
very important for sustaining GSS use in the long run.  Moreover, our findings imply that initiating an 
agreement of GSS use at the beginning of GSS transition is easier than correcting coordination 
failures later in the transition process. These findings suggest that packaged facilitation routines 
should include an additional component: the schedule for administering different facilitation practices. 
Based on an understanding of effectiveness of facilitation practices at different points in the GSS 
transition lifecycle, the schedule can vary the duration and intensity of different facilitation routines. 
This schedule can greatly enhance the adaptability of the CE approach to the dynamic nature of 
human interactions. 
 
The theoretical development and the multi-agent model of this study contribute to the literature in 
several ways. First, to our knowledge, this study presents the first formal characterization of the 
coordination problem during GSS transition. It also develops the critical mass view suggested by prior 
studies (e.g., DeSanctis and Poole, 1994; Grudin, 1994; Gallivan, 2001). By articulating self-
sustained GSS use as a coordination problem, we are able to draw on a rich body of literature from 
behavioral economics.  To some extent, this study serves as a bridge between the CE literature and 
the game theory in economics. The minimum-effort coordination game framework and the 
propositions about facilitation’s contributions open up the “black box” of the impact of human 
interactions on GSS transition and the moderating effect of facilitation practices. By mapping the 
common facilitation practices of the two general interventions to coordination failures in the minimum-
effort game, we offer a fine-grained view of the multiple pathways underlying how facilitation results in 
self-sustained GSS use. 
 
A second contribution of this study is the multi-agent simulator. The simulator is essentially an artifact 
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developed based on the design science approach (Hevner et al., 2004). Following the fundamental 
principle of design science (Hevner et al., 2004), we demonstrate a valuable approach to gain 
knowledge and understanding of a design problem (in this study, packaging the best practices of 
facilitation) through the building and application of the simulator. Although the findings from the 
simulator cannot be applied in a strict numeric sense, they help us realize nuances of GSS facilitation 
that are difficult to identify in either laboratory or field studies. For example, by designing facilitation 
behavioral rules in the multi-agent model, we achieve an in-depth understanding about how 
facilitation may affect GSS use by modifying the inputs to the decision, belief, or learning functions of 
agents. Moreover, when conducting experiments in the simulator, we identify new questions (e.g., the 
timing of the presence of facilitation) and perform immediate follow-up research. This would be 
difficult to pursue with other research approaches. We believe that the multi-agent simulator is a 
valuable tool for the CE community to gain new insights and pose questions from new angles. 
Subsequently, it improves the effectiveness of the CE community by extending the value of the best 
facilitation practices to more GSS supported work processes.   
5.1. Limitation and Future Work 
This study represents the starting point of our inquiry into the dynamic and adaptive characteristics of 
GSS transition with multi-agent simulation. At the current stage, the multi-agent model is still an 
oversimplified version of real world processes. While the simplification is necessary to accommodate 
the exploratory nature of the study, it leads to several limitations of this paper.   
 
First, this study leaves out some important factors in the GSS context such as group cohesion and 
power. A next step for our inquiry is to incorporate these important factors. For example, a possible 
way to implement group cohesion in the multi-agent model is to utilize social network techniques. We 
can employ the link functions in Netlogo to represent social links among agents. Then, group 
cohesion can be measured as the strength and density of the social links. We anticipate that group 
cohesion has a positive effect on self-sustained GSS use, because strong social links among agents 
help improve their belief about others’ GSS use intention. The social network approach is also a 
potential way to implement power in the multi-agent simulation. Power may be measured as the 
degree of centrality of each agent in the social network. An interesting question regarding power is 
whether it moderates the contribution of facilitation to GSS transition. One conjecture is that 
participation of powerful people in GSS transition may enhance the effectiveness of facilitation 
because they increase the willingness of other members to adopt the technology. 
 
Second, we fixed several parameter values (e.g., group size and payoffs) in the current simulation in 
order to focus on the variables that are most relevant to our research questions. In the future, we plan 
to relax the parameter values to test their impact on the GSS transition outcome. For example, with 
respect to group size, experimental economic studies already provided some evidence that 
coordination is harder to achieve in larger groups (Weber, 2006). We anticipate that GSS use will be 
more difficult to reach and sustain as group size increases, because each additional member 
introduces more heterogeneity in interest or effort in GSS use. In addition, regarding payoffs, an 
interesting aspect to explore in future work is to vary the discrepancy between the GSS and defector 
payoffs. The discrepancy affects the tension between individual risk and group efficiency (Cooper et 
al., 1990; Van Huyck et al., 1990). We expect that the higher the GSS payoff relative to the defector 
payoff, the more likely agents will achieve GSS use, because the relatively higher GSS payoff makes 
GSS use a more appealing choice.  
 
Another common concern of the computational approach is that the results seem to be “pre-
determined” by the model design. It is true that the results are logical consequences of the model 
construction (otherwise, there is serious internal validity problem of the computational model). 
However, this does not mean that the new insights that emerged and the new questions asked during 
the model building and application processes could be predicted based on the initial model design. 
Once researchers understand how the behavioral rules in our model can generate the results, the 
value of our model in uncovering new insights and representing issues in a fresh new light is realized. 
 
As one of the first studies looking at the coordination problem in GSS transition, this paper shows the 
relevance of the subject and the need for further research. The theoretical development and the multi-
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agent simulation are exploratory in nature. They warrant future work that can more precisely describe 
and predict the effect of certain facilitation practices on self-sustained GSS use and, thereby, improve 
the performance of the CE approach.    
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Appendix A: Tutorial on Coordination Games 
The basic form of a coordination game, usually called pure coordination game, is characterized by 
complete symmetry between players, between strategies and between equilibria (Mehta et al., 1994). 
A classic example of pure coordination game is the game of “Heads and Tails” from Schelling’s 
seminal work (1960). In the game, multiple players write down either “heads” or “tails.”  If they 
simultaneously write down the same word, each is paid some given amount of money. If they write 
down different words, they receive nothing. In this pure coordination game, players have the same 
payoff structure, the same strategies (“heads” or “tails”) and the same expected value if either “heads” 
or “tails” becomes their unanimous choice.   
 
The pure coordination game has been refined in several ways to represent more complex situations. 
One family of refined coordination games is called minimum effort games (Van Huyck et al., 1990; 
Camerer and Knez, 2000; Knez and Camerer, 1994; Cachon and Camerer, 1996; Chaudhuri et al., 
2001).  In a minimum effort game, players have to invest some effort to achieve a potential payoff, but 
the actual payoff to all players is tied to the effort of the person who contributes the least. A simple 
example of minimum effort games is a chain-building exercise. In the game, each member of a group 
is responsible for building one link of the chain. Each member can either invest $1 to build a weak link 
or invest $10 to build a strong link. After each member has independently decided whether to build a 
weak or strong link, the links are joined into a chain and the strength of the chain is tested. The chain 
is only as strong as the weakest link; that is, the chain is strong if all the links are strong or weak even 
if only one weak link is present. Each member in the group earns $5 if the chain is weak or $30 if the 
chain is strong. Thus, a person who chooses to build a weak link earns $4 regardless of the choices 
of others whereas a person who chooses to build a strong link may either lose $5 or earn $20 
depending on others’ actions. The chain-building exercise demonstrates an essential difficulty in 
coordination: the dilemma between protecting individual resources or investing the resources towards 
a group goal, but taking the risk of losing individual investment.   
 
One distinct feature of this type of minimum effort game is that coordination can still occur at separate 
outcomes, such as strong link building and weak link building in the chain-building exercise. However, 
there are obvious differences in potential benefits of outcomes. The coordination games with such 
asymmetric benefits of outcomes are often referred to as coordination games with Pareto-ranked 
equilibria. Here, an equilibrium (or pure-strategy Nash equilibrium) is a game outcome in which no 
player can gain anything by being the only person to change his/her choice (Gibbons, 1992). When 
we order the equilibria of a coordination game by their potential benefits to the whole group, we get 
Pareto-ranked equilibria. The equilibrium with the highest potential benefit is called the Pareto optimal 
equilibrium (Gibbons, 1992). Experimental economists find that players often fail to choose the Pareto 
optimal equilibrium in a coordination game even if the Pareto ranking is salient (Camerer, 2003; Van 
Huyck et al., 1990, 1991; Cooper et al., 1990, 1992). They attribute the result to strategic uncertainty. 
That is, players either do not interpret the Pareto ranking correctly or they are uncertain about other 
players’ interpretation. Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria reveal another difficulty in 
coordination: uncertainty about potential benefits of outcomes. Table A1 shows a comparison 
between the minimum-effort coordination game with the pure coordination game. 
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